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by 
Marx W .  Wartofsky 
1. PREFACE 
The thesis which I want to propose in this paper is that human vision has a 
history, which begins where the biological evolution of the human visual system 
lets off. The history of human vision is like the history of nations, or of art. or of 
technology, or of science: It is a social history which develops in the contexts ,of 
social practice, and in partkular, in conjunction with changes in what I will call 
modes of representational praxis (e.g. painting, dramatic arts, et<:.). This is a his­
tory which has not been written, because it has not been identified. Nevertheless. 
it exists, and the material for its reconstruction are either already at hand (in his­
tories of art, olf archaeology , of technology, of social practice) or they remain to be 
discovered by empirical research guided by theories which recognize the distinction 
between biology and culture and which can imaginatively formulate the social and 
historical parameters of ways of seeing. 
In this paper, I will lay out only some preliminary considerations for such an 
approach . (That is the force of the weasel-word "toward" in the title.) First, I will 
address some central features of vision, in animal and human life; and I will bow in 
the direction of those theories which take these features seriously into account in 
attempting to understand human visual perception - namely, the evolutionary epis­
temologies associated with the names (Dona.Id) Campbell, Popper, Paiget, Quine, 
Toulmin, Shimony, Yilmaz, among others. But then I will demarcate all ahistorical 
theories of vision - including the classical empiricist and rationalist theories - from 
an historical epistemology like my own. I will go on to discuss some of the para· 
meters of human vision whic·h account for its historicity - namely, what I will call 
visual intentionalities, visual semantics and visual scenarios; and conclude with a 
view of the symbolic nature of visual cognitive activity, and of the formation and 
transformation of visual structures as units of cultural evolution. 
2. VISION & LIGHT 
Vision preoccupies us, night and day, waking and dreaming. To be awake is, 
among other things, to have one's eyes open, to be visually aware of one's surround­
ings, of visual events, scenes, objects - in short, to see what's going on. Even in 
sleep, when we dream, whatever else is going on, dream-onset is recognized by so­
called Rapid Eye Movements, - REMS - suggesting the visual activity which is 
characteristically reported in dream-accounts, of things "seen" in the theatre of the 
mind. So too, in what we call visual imagination, we seem to hold before some 
inner eye the images, internal representations, pictures summoned up by ourselves, 
or evoked in us by suggestion, or remembered, or created. Even for those who have 
lost sight, and those who have never had it, language abounds In the metaphor of 
vision, the vocabulary or visibles, and reference to the seen world; and adaptation to 
blindness comes with sunogate modes of access to the information which is other­
wise visual. 
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Sighted creatures constitute almost all or the millions of animal species, from 
the insects among the invertebrates, to the \'ertebrates. Among the vertebrates. 
there are rew exceptions - blind fish in s.unll>ss depths of ocean . soml> ca\'e-dwell· 
ing mammals, creatures or the dark for whom light brings no news, and who there­
fore have evolved to become informed by other means. All the rest live in, and by 
the light of the sun, and have evolved tlhe extraordinarily complex receptivities 
which (unction as sight: from the surface receptors which are finely specialized to 
one or another aspect or the ambient light - wavelength, dark-light boundaries or 
edges, slant, polarization - to the complex structures of visuaJ processing and visual 
activity which operate beyond the surface receptors, whether in coordinating the 
thousand-faceted image which the Oy's eye constructs; or in the functionally spare 
responses to shapes and motions or predalor and prey which characterize the frog's 
eye; or in the extraordinarily complex visual pathways from retinal neurons to vis· 
ual cortex which mark the higher vertebrates, and among them, the human species. 
From the first elaborations or photo-sensitivity at the chemical and biochem­
ical level to the many-branched adaptations to light among living species, the re­
trieval of information from the environment seems to be a major function of JiK>to­
receptive structures. In plant life, photo-reception is essential to metabolism: 
photosynthesis is a means - and thus far, the most efficient means - of 
using light�nergy to transform environment into nutriment. In its neural 
structure, in capacities for selective recognition and response, in the acti­
vities of scanning and focusing, the animal eye objectifies the evolved and ad­
apted needs and modes of action of the species. Among the sense-modalities, sight, 
like hearing, is a distance-receptor, an early warning system of things and events far 
o!!, and or their motion and direction. The visual system, then, is the product of 
evolutiona.ry adaptation to a world bathed in light, and therefore accessilble in many 
or its features through signals within the visible spectrum. 
3. THEORIES OF VISION 
It is these ubiquitous features of tbe anatomy and physiology of the visual 
systems of animals, and or their evolution, that has led evolutionary epistemologists 
to treat human vision as a special, species-specific case of this biological adaptation, 
and lo account for the light-world of human existence in terms of the biological 
life-world of our species. What we see, on this view, is a function of the specific 
adaptation of the mammalian eye to the ecological niche we have carved out for 
ourselves in the course or our evolution. The epistemofogical content of such an 
approach lies in an account of the conditions for visual knowledge of the external 
world which such an adapted system provides. 
Earlier, n9n�volutionary theories or human vision focused on the formation 
of the visual image - whether Democritus' !!ldolei or the retinal image formed by 
the lens of the eye, according to the geometrical optics of Kepler, or Descartes, or 
Newton; or the mental images adduced by Locke, or Berkeley, or Hume, as sensible 
"ideas" or "impressions". By contrast to these earlier theories, evolutiionary epis­
temology attempts to relate this image-formation itself to the evolved strategies 
and needs of human action in the visual world. The epistemological question, how­
ever concerns not so much the structure of vision, or of image-formation, but rather 
the question of visual knowledge: how are we to know that the visual ideas, or per­
ceptions are veridical, that the visual judg;ments arrived at by means of the eye are 
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true, that the objects and e\'ents &een do in fact exist, and are as th.ey are perceived? 
Visual skepticism arises out of perceptual error and illusion. The classic philo­
sophical theories of \ision, insofar as they addressed themselves to epistemological 
questions, beyond the accounts given of the psychology and physiology of vision. 
or of the science of optics, fell on either side of the traditional division between 
empiricist and rationalist approaches. What Plato, Aristotle, Descartes or Locke 
sought was an argument for how, or whether, the visual appearances of things could 
yield ,·eridical knowledge. And, in fact, even the apparently descriptive accounts of 
visual process, of image-formation, of the optics and dioptrics of vision were framed 
as explicit or tacit attempts to answer this question. The causal realism which as· 
cribes the visual information to the stimulus, and presupposes the transparent read­
ing of this information by the eye, answers the question of the veridicality of vis· 
ual perception in a simple way: the eye sees what's there, by the direct causal rela­
tion between the object of sight and the visual impression of that object correctly 
formed by the eye. The "correctness" of this visual impression or idea is no more 
than a description of how the mechanism works. Perceptual error is therefore a 
function of a breakdown or variation in the causal mt-1.!hianism: the light is refract· 
ed, i.e. the medium introduces distortion, or the receptive mechanism is flawed, by 
injury or disease. Causal theories of perception, like Locke's, foundered on the 
criticism that we had no alternative or independent access to the nature of the caus­
es of vision than vision itself; thus the question of visual veridicality was caught in 
a circle, or what one may call the videocentric pI1edicament. To break out of the 
circle by appe.aJ to the confirming or disconfirminig evidence of the other senses -
principally, touch - created only two circles where there was previously only one, 
but failed to solve the problem posed by phenomenalism, namely, how do we get 
beyond sensible appearances to what they are the appearances or? Empiricism. in 
Berkeley's version, had to call in God to guarantee perceptual veridicality, and only 
by virtue of calling upon intellection - the notions o f  the mind - as the represen· 
tations caused in us by the Divine (and hence veridical) notions. Thus, theological 
causation had to be called to the rescue of phenomenalistic empiricism. The alterna· 
tive - a skepticism which wrote off truth to what was customary, or a natural habit 
or the mind, reinforced by past successes - threw the whole question into turmoil, 
with Hume. 
The rationalists trod a similar path. Cartesian doubts as to the veridicality of 
sense-perception, and of sight as the paradigmatic case, was resolved by Descartes 
only by appeal to an a priori argument, once again of a theological sort: God would 
not systematically deceive us. or He wouldn't be God, but a demon instead. 
The radi<Cal resolution of this problem was proposed by Kant: the truth about 
the world, and of our perceptual judgments, is relativized to what coulc,! be known, 
or perceived by us, given the structures of knowledge and perception that we have. 
Since this is the only possibility there is for human knowledge, we have only to seek 
the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of such knowledge in the 
a priori structures of perception and judgment. Having established these, we can 
seek no farther, to ask what things are really like, in themselves; only how they 
must necessarily appear to us, given such structures. Thus the categoricity of our 
knowledge of the external world devolved. upon the inescapable anthropocentri­
city of our modes of access to such knowledge. The Protagorean view that man is 
the measure o·f all things was interpreted not as an epistemic relativism, but as the 
very condition of the necessity and universality of knowledge. 
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To this sketch of the history of leading philosophical theories of knowledge, 
it should be added that the dominant mode� of perceptual !knowledge is allways (and 
often exclusively) vision. More important, lnoweYer, is the thrust of this theoretical 
development: it seeks the universal, species-wide, necessary and unchanging condi­
tions or human knowledge in general, and of visual perception in particular. What 
evolutionary epistemology adds to this account is the argument that this universal 
species--structure h.as evolved biologically, that it wasn't al ways what it has become, 
that itJ; functions and features are neces.sary only in the biologically relati\'ized sense 
that they h.ave been selec-Ud out by the mechanisms of natural·selection. The epis­
temological warrant for the veridicaJity of perception rests, therefore, entirely on 
evolutionary success over the long run, and in general. In short, the structure of 
vision maps the adaptive successes of a form of life: veridicality mean_§ 
no m o re than this, and there is no further appeal. T h e  criterion of truth 
in perception has thus, so to speak, been embedded in the genetic struc­
tures of perce ptio n ,  by the process of natural selection. O n  this view, 
th e n ,  !biology resolves the normative argument about the basis o f  veridi­
cality in perce ption. 
The evolutionary epistemologists-and here we may c o u n t  D. 
Camplbell,  Q u i n e ,  Popper, Piaget, S h i m o n y ,  Y i l m a z  among contempor­
aries, and H u m e ,  Mach and James as forebears-have been open to the 
charge of committing the genetic fallacy, namely that o f  basing the val­
idity or veridicality o f  perceptual judgments on their origins, in an ad­
aptively successful biological structure. Yet their argument is sub tler 
than this,  and has,  in fact, a Kantian form : If knowledge, a n d  correct 
perceptual judgments are possible at all, w h a t  it means for such know­
ledge to be true, or for such judgments to be veridical is  just that truth 
and v e ridicality are measures of the successful operation o f  these struc­
tures; and "successful" here means "normally functioning." Thus, as in 
the Kantian argume,nt,  the norm itself is given by the "innate" structure, 
and there is n o  appeal beyond it; except that in the case of evolutionary 
epistemology, the innate structures of perception o r  of j u d g m e n t  are 
themselves evolved, a n d  not transce n d e ntally give n :  they are, i n  Piaget's 
phrase, "biologically a priori,', i.e. they are species a priori, as the prod­
uct o f  evolution, and their "necessity" is therefore a contingent necess­
i t y ;  they m ig h t  have been otherwise, h a d  evolution proceeded different­
l y ,  o r  had the environment been different. 
Both the traditional and evolutionary epistemologies share a com­
mon f'eature, however differently it is arrived at: they propose an essen­
tial structure for h u m a n  cognition and perception, that is, o n e  w h i c h  is 
universal for the species, unchanging, and (in differing senses) necessary. 
W h a t  for the seventeenth and eighteenth century e m p i ricism and ration­
alism was the "structure of the h u m an m i n d , "  or the "nature of the 
h u m a n  u n derstan d i n g "  or the "a priori forms o f  perception or of judg­
m e n t , , has become the evolved species-structure, the biological a priori 
of evolutionary epistemology. In both cases, the 'human modes o f  per­
ceptual and cognitive activity are given , once and for all: they are !Jlis­torical. W h a t  !! historical, of course, is t h e  changing content of our 
knowledge, and also, presumably, the variable content of o u r  percep­
tion. W h at w e  see changes; h o w  we see doesn't, on this account. The 
26 
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structures of perception, though they vary from o n e  species to the n e x t ,  
are fixed for each species, for h u m ans a s  for o t h e r  anim als. 
4. TO W A R D  AN H I STORICAL EPIST E M O LOGY 
T h i s  i s  t h e  point at which my introductory remarks e n d ,  a n d  m y  
paper, properly speaking, begins. For I believe this view to be false. I 
want to speak about the historv of visual perception, n a m e l y .  about 
the cultural history o f  vision, beyond its biological e \'Olu t i o n .  My thesis. 
though it is c o m p atible w i t h  that of the evolutionary epistem ologists, 
up to the p o i n t  of h u m an speciation, differs radically from theirs, be­
yond that p o i n t  and from the traditional essentialist \' iews o f  both e m ­
piricism a n d  rationalism. W h a t  I propose is a n  historical epistemo logy . 
which understands the h u man modes of cognition and perception as 
q u alitatively different from all animal modes. precisely in that only t h e  
h u m an m o d e s  are historical. What I mean by t h i s  historicity w i l l  e m e rg e  
as I develop t h e  argu m e n t .  B u t  initially, o n e  may say that a m o d e  of 
cognition or of perception is historical i f  it changes with changes in the 
h u man forms of praxis,  i . e .  of production, o r  technology, o r  social or­
ganization, or most specifically, with changes in the forms o f  represen­
tation w h i c h  mark h u m an technical, linguistic, theoretical and artistic 
activity. The wider thesis of such an historical epistemology, I which I 
develop elsewhere ]1 ,can only be alluded to briefly here as backgro u n d .  
W h a t  I wish t o  focus o n  i n  this paper is t h e  historicity o f  \'isual percep­
t i o n ,  n a m e l y ,  the claim that m o d e s  o f  visual perception and visual cog­
nition change; that it is not only what w e  see, or learn to see which var­
ies with cultural-historical change, but the very structures o f  visio n  
themselves. 
To put this in the sh.arpest way, 1 propose that h u m a n  \'ision, u n ­
l i k e  that of any other a n i m a l  species, i s  transformed by the very practice 
of visual representation, i . e .  the m a k i n g  and use of pictures, o r  of other 
forms o f  visual representation. I take representation-the production o f  
representational artifacts-to b e  the distinctive h u m a n  practice wh iclh 
breaks o u r  visual activity loose from that o f  the a n i m a l world, and 
w h i c h ,  in effect, transforms the world-picture, o r  the world seen into a 
w o rld-scene. W h at I am cl.aiming is that we see by way of o u r  picturing 
o r  our pictorial represe ntation, and that changes in the styles o r  m o d e s  
o f  pictorial representation are instances o f ,  a n d  also socially e ffect 
changes in m o d es o f  visual cognition. The genetically transmitted struc­
tures o f  species perception are therefore transcended in this historical 
evolution o f  vision, whose m o dalities are no longer biological o r  neuro­
physiological, but rather cultural:  art-historical, theoretical, praxical­
technical. 
The peculiarity o f  this historical develo p m e n t  oC vision is that it is 
reflexive:  we produce the changes or transformations in o u r  visual fac­
ulties by means of o u r  own activity, in the forms of o u r  representation­
al  practice. W h at all this derives fro m ,  in m y  view, Is the fundamental 
feature o f  o u r  species-life: that w e  produce artifacts, that w e  are toot 
makers, and that the m o d e  of o u r  artifact-production is social,  interac-
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tive, requiring the development of complex forms of social communica­
tion, that is to say, of language. through which the coo rdinat ion of this 
species activity takes place, and by means of which the acquired or new­
ly created ways of making and doing can be preserved and transmitted 
from one person to another, and from one generation to the next.  Thus, 
it is a result o f  this activity of transforming nature into artifact, turning 
the merely existent into the useful or the valuable, that we transform 
our o w n  cognitive a n d  perceptual modes. The upshot of all this activity 
is a history, which we make; and also the historicity of the means by 
which we make it, and come to know it. 
W here biological evolution ends, cultural evolution begins. A t  this 
juncture there is a revolution in  the means of adaptation, and tne pro­
cess o f  change. Whereas in biological evolution, natural selection oper­
ates on the gene pool, and adaptation depends on the preservation or 
elimination of genetic m u tations, and combinations, and on the trans­
mission of traits by genetic means, in cultural evolution a very different 
mechanism is at w o r k .  Here, changes im the cultural features and struc­
tures olf' human life-in forms or social organization, in  language, in tech­
nology or modes of productive praxis, in  k n o w ledge-are preserved and 
transmitted not by the genes, but by artifacts, i.e. by means of these 
very cultural structures themselves, w h ich are created and changed by 
human practice. Thus,  acquired characteristics-changes in modes of 
action, in tech n i q u e ,  in social structure, in knowledge- are transmitted 
from one generation to the next. In short, cultural evolution is Lamar­
cklan, while biological evolution is Darwinean. This means an extraor­
dinary !ability, and a more rapid rate of change and o f  adaptation than 
is provided by genetic selection. Moreo·ver, since this cultural evolution 
is the product of the workings of conscious practice and of h u m  an pur­
posiveness, it  is open to direction by such purpose: it is, in a qualified 
sense, teleological. It is this sort of cultural evolution which constitutes 
the domain of history, and separates it from biological evolution. 
In this context, I would like to propose my strongest claim : that 
human vision is itself an artifact; that with the advent of h u m a n  culture; 
the visual system breaks loose from its previous biological domain, a n d  
acquires a history; a n d  that in  this history, it  i s  w e  w h o  shape a n d  trans­
form the modes of visual praxis, o f  visual cognition and perception. I 
want to propose that the means whereby we do this is the making a n d  
use o f  tools, and of language. Again, I cannot presen t  t h e  full argument 
here, which I develop elsewher� The gist of it, for the purpose at hand, 
is that with the development of this representational praxis, we come to 
see by means of the forms and styles of visual representation that we 
create; and that our modes of visual pe·rception change with changes in  
these modes of representation. To put this  in terms o f  one major form 
of such visual representation: we pictorialize the seen world, in the prac­
tice of vision itself, by the making and use of pictorial representations 
of that. world. We come to see in  the ways our pictures represent. A n d  
just as ways of pictorial representation have a history, so too do our 
ways o· f  seeing have- a history. 
This may seem like a variant of the old view in aesthetics that "Na-
28 
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ture imitates Art." In Oscar Wilde's  classical statement of th i s  \'iew, he 
has Vivian say ( in the Preface to The Pict ure of Dorian Gray ) ; " . . . Na­
ture is no great mother who bas borne us. She is o u r  creation. It  is in 
our brain t h a t  she quickens into life. T h in g s  are because w e  see them. 
and how w e  see and what w e  see depends on the A r t s  that h8\'e inOu­
enced us. To l o o k  al a thing is \·ery different from seeing a thing .... At 
present people see fogs, n o t  because there are fogs, b u t  because p o ets 
and painters ha\'e taught them the mysterious loveliness of such effects. 
Th ere m a y  have been fogs for centuries in L o n d o n .  1 dare say there 
were. But no o n e  saw t h e m ,  and so w e  do not know anything about 
t h e m .  T h e y  did not exist until A r t  invented them .... " A n d  further, he 
say s :  "Where [ N ature J used to give us Coro ts and D aubign y s ,  she gives 
us n o w  exquisite M o n et s  and entrancing Pisarros." 
T h e  confusion b e t w e e n  w h a t  there is to be seen, and w h a t  we see 
at  as, persists in W ilde's account.  ("There may have been f o g s  in London 
for centuries. I dare say there were.")  W e  resolve it  glibly, epistemolog­
ically, by distinguishing " w h a t  m e e t s  the eye" from our "interpretation" 
of it .  But m o d e rn discussion, especially on the question o f  o bservation 
in science, has rediscovered and developed further the older view .. . that 
visual observation is "theory-laden," t h a t  o u r  seeing is so involved with 
categories o f  interpretation, or frameworks of  expectat ion,  that the 
"innocent eye" is a m y t h .  The transparency of the so-called interpre­
tive frameworks o r  vision i s  such that we see through th e m  ( in both 
senses o f  "through", i .e.  w e  fail  to notice them, and w e  also see by 
m e a n s  o f  t h e m ) .  W e  are given, therefore, t o  w h a t  Feyerbend calls 
"natural interpretations," i .e.  to what seems to u s  directly given In per­
ception, as self-evident and !:!..!.!interpreted. W i t h  changes in theoretical 
framework, the "given" is reformed. Thus,  in t h e  long discussion, start­
ing with Wittgenstein's  notiora  of "seeing-as" and proceeding through 
the elaborations and d e b a t e s  in the philosophy of science, (in Popper. 
Toulmin, Hanson, K u h n ,  F e y e rabend and o t h e rs), visual perception be­
comes freighted with high theory. This is not  m y  concern ltere, though 
it i s  of a piece with m y  more general thesis.  T h e  focus here is on the 
more literally pictorial frameworks of vision, and with w h a t  usually 
pass for the low er-level more directly descriptive aspects of seeing.  
S. W A Y S  OF SEEING 
L e t  me begin to focus. then,  on this question: W h a t  i s  a "way of 
seeing" or a " m o d e  o f  visual praxis?" And w h a t  is involved In effec ting. 
a change in such a m o d e ,  historically? Here, I w a n t  to deal  with three 
issues: first, w h a t  I will call visual intentionalities; second, a n d  closely 
* T h a t  view is at  least as old as Plato's M e n o  B u t  It  i s  elaborately and 
persuasively set forth in the first section o f  Hegel's Ph e n o m enology ot 
M in d  ("On the Certainty of t h e  S e n s e s " ) .  I a m  n o t  accusing W i t t g e n ­
stein, a n d  certainly n o t  H a n s o n ,  o f  reading H e g e l .  Popper, however, 
d i d ,  though it is n o t  clear to w h a t  effect. 
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related, what I will call visual sema ntics, or the issue or meaning and 
reference in vision ;  and finally, with what r wrnt call visual scenario� 
i.e. with the functional aspect or those representational artifaiets which 
give the rule to our seeing. Here, I will consider only two or the major 
types of scenarios, paintings and dramatic performances, though there 
are others equally important, like architecture, landscape, a n d  books, 
or reading. The three categories or my analysis here are (somewhat arti· 
ficially) distinguishable as: the subjective aspect or \•isual actjvity (the 
intentionalities), the objective aspect (the scenarios) and the i n teractive 
aspect (the semantics). But this schema may be misleading. I include it 
only to satisfy a compu lsion for philosophical constructions of a tradi· 
tional sort. 
Vision, we may say, is always directed upon some object. That is 
not to say that vision is a discrete activity which literally picks out 
objects as themselves discrete or well·defined entiti«i>'i "in the world." 
Rather, what is conno ted by the directedness of vision is the variety of 
intentionalities which vision reveals. I will speak here only of h u m an 
visual intentionalities, leaving aside the question of the intentionalities 
or animal vision. By "intentionality" I do not mean only the conscious, 
or self.conscious action which involves the explicit awareness of look· 
ing for or looking at something. Such self-conscious intentionality, re­
quiring reflective awareness of the end or aim of a visual action I will 
stipulate as teleological; and not all intentionality is teleological in this 
sense. 
To distinguish intentionalities, we may introduce a difference be· 
tween what Ryle called "task·verbs" and "achievement·verbs": Seeing 
is an achieve m e n t :  it conno tes the successful completion of a visual 
action. Looking is a task: it connotes the process which terminates in 
seeing. Thus, I may look at something, in the sense of dire·cting m y  
gaze upon i t ,  and yet fail to see it. Thus, the com mon situation :  "Where 
is my book?" "You 're looking at it, dum m y ! "  O ne may defer and say, 
"No, in fact, l wasn't looking at it. I wasn't looking at anything, because 
l wasn't directing my conscious attention upon i t .  If  I were looking, I 
would have seen it." O f  course, I m ight have been gazing distractedly 
in that direction. O r  l may have been peering, o r  looking for the book 
in a badly lit room, and trying to m a k e  out the shape andldentities of 
half-seen objects. Or again, I might have been scanning, but failing to 
notice. My companion may have been watching m e  do all this, or visual· 
ly studying m y  behavior, while I overlooked what was directly before 
me.  A n d  so o n .  
I a m  n o t  attempting anything so dreary a s  a n  ordinary language 
analysis of visual terms, nor anything so ambitious as a phenomenology 
of seeing. I only want to p.oint out, in an ordinary way, that we have a 
rich vocabulary which distinguishes the visual intentionalities of look· 
ing, observing, looking at, looking for, seeing as, gazing, watching, peeT­
ing, scanning, studying, scrutinizing, as well as terms for failed intention­
alities, like overlooking, etc. In addition, there are a range of success­
terms tor sight, which invol\te the cognitive purposes of vision: re cog· 
nizing, identifying, discriminating, noticing, all of which connote under· 
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standing something \'isually. In fact, "seeing" has the n o n -\'isual and 
more general sense or "und erstanding" in the usage, "I  see" or "I  see 
what you mean." 
Beyond these two \'isual modalities o f  search and disco\•ery, there 
is the range of expressive or commu nicati\'e "looks" which in\'Ol\'e the 
eyes themsel\'es as bearers of intentions, and n o t  simply as instruments 
of \'isual intentionalities. I leave such a Sartrean phenomenology of 
''looks" to others, mentioning only such examples as ogling,  leering, 
warning looks, lo\'ing,  hating,  curious, cold, passionate or dispassionate 
looks, puzzled or blank looks, looks of c o m p rehension, conspiratorial 
looks, frightened or aggressive looks, debonair and nai\'e looks, and so 
on and o n .  Here, the eyes, as windows of the soul,  betray o r  comm uni·  
cate intentions e x p ressively, which marks off an area of the subjectivity 
of vision different in focus from what we are doing when we are seeing. 
Visual intentionalities, then , are a class of h u m an actions which 
are elaborated as a result of the contexts of vision which culture and 
history provide. N o w  it seems true that all or almost all  of the directed 
modes are available also to anim als, or at least t.o the higher vertebrates. 
Search and discovery are not specific to h u m a n s .  Yet, the peculiar forms 
of such visual activity which mark h u m an life are, I claim , not only 
distinctive, but historical as well. That is, the specific modes of looking 
at, watching, observing, scanning, etc., as well as those of identifying, 
recognizing, seeing as, etc. are transformations o f  the biologically evolv· 
ed modes which we inherit from our evolution. For example,  seeing a 
book, or looking for a white blood cell on a m  icroscope slide, o r  recog· 
nizing the constellation Ursa Major, or watching a performance of K i n g  
Lear, or gazing at a sunset, are all culture-laden modes of visual activity, 
not available to the animal eye. One may ari:ue that this is no more 
than the education of vision ,  and that visual structure as such remains 
the same. Here, there may be either an arg u m e n t  or a conceptual stipu· 
lation to b e  m a d e .  I think that such a reduction of vision to, say, either 
its physiological structures, or to its universal, or transhistorical fea· 
tures, (i.e. to those which may be abstracted as species-specific, and thus 
invariant through cultural or historical transformation) is, though useful 
for some purposes . also misleading. For it abstracts from vision, - i.e. 
from human vision - just those criteria! features which make it h u m a n :  
namely, the elaborated range of visual intentionalities o f  wh ich it is cap· 
able, and which historicize it. For it is the creation of new contexts, 
or indeed, objects which occasion or call forth the concrete elabora­
tion of specific intentionalities; and these c o n texts are distinctly cul­
tural-historical innovations. 
This leads me to the issue o f  visual semantics. The argument here 
is rather simple and has already been alluded to: I have proposed that 
the visual system is plastic, open to transformation by the workings of 
representational praxis, and m o re broadly, to the effects of changes in 
the visual environment. The history of visual perception is a social his­
tory. The categories of our perceptual activity are shaped by the require· 
men ts placed on this perception by n e w  modes of social, technological, 
scientific and artistic activity. With such cultural change and develop· 
ment, these requirements become (increasingly) semantically rich and 
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complex. By this 1 mean that the contexts of reference, t h e  t y p es of 
events, entities, relations, the object:s presented for visual recognition. 
understanding, identification, become ramified, and novel. Whal we see. 
or are expected to recognize, changes. A b ilities to discriminate, earlier 
not a requirement, now become c o m m o n p laces of visual practice. In 
this sense, the acquisition or a changing vocabulary o r  visual forms, of 
visual referents, o f  visual meanings is the normal c u l t u ral adaptation of 
the h ru man visual system to new needs. For exam pie, there is the story 
told by Beebe, the famous explorer, who had j u s t  given a lecture to a 
New York audience, in which he noted the highly developed discrimin· 
ative capacities w h ich h u n ters in the jungle had acquired, for being able 
to recognize, from the crack o f  a twi:g,  what sort of animal was nearby, 
what direction it was moving in,  and so forth. After the lecture, walk· 
ing through a crowded New York street, one o f  the audience was ex­
pressing his amazement at such aural discrimination, and lament ing 
the loss of it in civilized life. Beebe proposed an experiment. H e  drop­
ped a dime on the sidewalk, in the midst o f  New York street noise, 
traffic, etc. Instantly, dozens o f  people stopped and looked around to 
see wlhere the coin had fallen. 
There are m a n y  such examples. B u t  one may argue that the train· 
ing in such perceptual-discriminative skills is no distinctive mark of 
h u m a n  perception. O n e  may condition a rat, a d o g ,  or a pigeon to per­
form highly specific acts o f  perceptual discrimination; it is there rore, all 
a matter of training, n o t  of "ways of seeing" (or o f  hearing}.  The differ­
ence is crucial, however.  For in h u m an life, such identification, recog­
nition and discrimination become social and c u l t u ral capacities of a 
common sort, shared by large groups, a n d ,  moreover, preserved and 
transmitted through the m e d i u m  of culture, i.e. of education, work,  
social life, from one generation to the next,  or from o n e  group to 
another. The analogy with language is a p t  here: the meaning a n d  refer­
ence of terms, or o f  linguistic expressions is central to u n d e rstanding 
and using a language. A n d  historical semantics shows how s u c h  meaning 
and reference c h anges. The notion that a language has esse ntial,  fixed, 
ahistorical, or a priori semantic structure makes no sense. At most, one 
may claim that language as such , abstractly or u n i versally considered, 
has essential features o f  reference and meaning, as, components o f  w h a t  
make i t  a language. But concrete reference a n d  m e a n i n g ,  w i t h i n  such 
structures, changes historically. And i t  is at least an open question 
whether there may not also be historical changes in semantic structures or indeed 
alternative abstract semantic structu res in different natural languages. 
Similarly, one may propose that not only the specific "terms" o f  visual 
reference and meaning change historically, b u t  that the visual categories 
of such reference are also variable, either comparatively across d i fferent 
cultures, or historically. Tliis does not m e a n  that there are no semantic 
invariants in the "language" o f  vision, which are cross-cultural and trans· 
historical. Just as biological adaptation bas designated, for some species, 
the specific identities, the "meaning" and "reference" of certain con­
tours, colors, or types of motion, so too it may b e  that h u m an c u l tural 
life shares, across d i fferent cultu res, historical epochs, and varying modes 
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of social praxis, some basic and in,·ariant \'isual referents and meanings. 
What is biologically or genetically encoded c>r "hard·wired" in animal 
perceptual systems is a range or innate or instincli\'e perceptual recogni· 
tion capacities-e.g. for shape and size of "food.like" objects, for newly 
batched chicks (Fantz's work). or "cliff-effect" in young animals and 
children, or pattern-recognition of predator and prey built into the 
retinal neurons of the frog, or the "meaning" of the color yellow as 
"poisonous" for a wide variety of birds. So, too. there may be such in­
variant species-wide visual responses in humans, some of w h ich may be 
genetic, others of which may be common, acquired visual recognitions 
resulting from common (transhistorical and transcultural) features of 
human social and productive life. But we cannot presume to know in 
advance, or a priori, which these are, if there are any. This is a question 
of empirical discovery, for which the most imaginative hypo theses and 
theories are required,(and on which significant contemporary research 
is being done)1. 
The general point, here, is that the evidence for variation in visual 
semantics is very great; and a plausible hy pothesis is that such variation 
is induced by the social ramification of requirements on visual reference 
which historical, technological and artistic change introduce. But this 
argues once again for the historicity of human visual perce ption, in a 
different way : the elaboration or the visual vocabulary, of the seman­
tics of vision, is not simply pressed upon us by either natural or random 
changes in the environment, or in the domain of visual praxis. Instead, 
it is the human creation of artifacts, and of forms of social life, and the 
h uman invention of new modes of action which produce these require· 
m e n ts upon vision. Moreover, (and to my mind, most crucially ),  it is 
the environment of representations of how things look w h ich direct 
vision to see them that way. Pictorial representation, and changes In 
styles or modes of representation, in effect teach us what to see, and 
how to see; and iR this way, such representation creates the referents 
of vision and their acquired meanings. Art history, therefore, becomes 
a special and central context for the study of the history of visual per­
c,eption itself. 
Finally, to the issue of visual scenarios. By a visual scenario, I 
mean the rules for a way o f  looking and o f  seeing which are embodied 
in a representational artifact. Pictures carry rules for loo king at them 
within themselves. Now tlbis is not to claim, in a more complicated 
w a y ,  hermeneutically, that the text commands the mode of its inter· 
pretation, though that more elaborated argument may be interesting to 
pursue. Here, 1 have a simpler proposal: that pictures are the sorts of 
things we loo k at from the front, and within a frame, and with a cer­
tain visual attitude. The way in which a picture "asks" (so to speak) to 
be looked at requires what I would call a certain visual posture. The 
scenario is therefore a rule, or a suggestion, as to w h a t  visual posture to 
assume. The same thing is true of theatrical performance, In its most 
common convention, the proscenium arch stage. Here too, a framed 
"scene," to be watched from a fixed position In front of it, dictates 
the appropriate posture to the audience (or should I say , vidience?). 
True, there are alternative visual postures, e.g. for continuous murals 
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which one has to follow by walking past the surface, or around it: 
rtiezes, a n d  sculpture-in-the-ro u n d ;  architecture; landscape: the reading 
of books. Movies and TV are parasitic o n  the conventional scenaTios o f  
framed pictures and theatrical performances and o u r  visual postures 
there are ubiquitous. (We may in fact evolve as the first sitting species!) 
O n e  may argue that seeing things in front of one is hardly a cul­
tural or historical .phenomenon. since binocular vision throughout the vertebrate kingdom is in the main forward -looking. That is true. But 
the visual posture w h ich is culturally and historically derived from this 
biological constraint is the u n n atural one o! watching from a fixed posi· 
tion. Though this is an occasional posture for h u n ting (and hu nted) 
animals, (as is the visual intentionality o'! watching), animal life is  mark­
ed by motion, and the eye is evolved as an organ for such dynamic 
activity. The determination of a scene as a framed visual plane, (what­
ever its occasional sources in animal life), becomes a dominant ,object 
of visual activity only with the historical introduction o f  pictorial and 
theatrical representation in a certain form. Moreover, I would s·uggest 
that the introduction o r  drawing and painting on a surface, i.e. a two 
dimensional representation, is a radical means of transforming h uman 
vision Into the pictorialized mode. For w h a t  becomes the object of 
vision is then what appears as if on a picture plane: the world comes to 
be seen as picture-l ike;  and the variation of pictorial styles then acquires 
a general purchase on the shaping of visual perception. Alternative can­
ons ot such perception then comes to define w h a t  the world "realty" 
looks like, when seen "correctly ,. or "realistically . . .  The most intrigu­
ing of such canons is the one which we have, for a variety of cultu ral 
and hist.orical reasons, adopted: namely, that of linear perspective in 
painting and drawing. B u t  that is a whole other kettle of fish which I 
will n o t  boil here, having done so elsewhere� It will suffice to m ention 
one hist.orical fact here:  that the visual posture which defines the per­
spective representation of objects and scenes is that of looking out o f  a 
window, and tracing what one sees as i t  is projected on the flat, framed 
window pane. W i n d o w s  are n o t  natural objects, b u t  products o f  a long 
architectural evolution. There are cultures which do not have the m ;  and 
where they exist, they are historically variant. It seems, the n ,  that for a 
proper history of visual perception. one would need not only a h istory of art, o r  o f  the theatre , b u t  also a history o f  architecture, and for 
Western art in particular, a history of windows. B u t  (to give in to a 
bad p u n )  that is n o t  m y  look-out in this paper. In short, the canon 
which we have adopted for representing "the way things really look" 
ls one which is itself an historical convention, requiring for its formulation 
a certain mode of theoretical, technical and artistic praxis. The con­
junction of all of these elements, in the happy circumstances o f  Flor­
ence in the 1 5th century, led to a rapid introduction a n d  dissemination 
of these rules of representation. The argument for th ,e historicity of this 
canon, as not merely a way of representing pictorially, but as a way o f  
seeing, ls an extended one, which again, I w ill n o t  give here. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusion, from these considerations or the contexts or h u ·  
m a n  vision, a n d  o f  its modes, is one which is not far remo,•ed from 
what was said earlier about the animal eye: namely , that the eye is the 
image of the life.world of a species. The difference between the animal 
eye and the h u m a n  eye lies in the difference between life worlds of 
animals and h u m ans. But here, the difference is not merely one of de· 
gree, or of uriations within a common biological world, but rather a 
difference in k i n d .  And it is this diHerence which permits o n e  to speak 
of a history of visual perception, which departs qualitatively from ac· 
counts of an evolutionary sort. The qualitative distinction is that be· 
tween biology and culture; and it is on this distinction, or rather on 
confusions concerning it, that the nature·nurture controversies arise. 
M o re specifically, it is on the basis of the confusion of this distinction 
that evolutionary epistemology fails (or fails to go far enough); that 
Piaget's genetic epistemology veers, though uncertainly, towards a re· 
ductive biologism; and that the current theories of sociobiology most 
dangerously subordinate the whole domain of culture and history to a 
reductive genetic determinism. So there is much at stake in getting the 
distinction between biology and culture clear, in general, as well as in 
the approach to a theory o f  human vision. 
To begin, as I do, with the admittedly metaph ysical statement that 
vision is the image o f  life, o.r that the eye maps the life world of a spec· 
ies into its structure, is not yet to distinguish biological from cultural 
or social·historical life.worlds. The variety o f  life.worlds a m o n g  tens o f  
thousands of sighted animal species is certainly exhibited In the variety 
of adaptive structures which have evolved and differentiated among 
the m .  And thus,  we may say that persons, l ike other animals, are sim· 
ply another such species. W h a t  all have in com m o n ,  (or w h a t  the sighted 
species have in c o m m o n )  is the sym bolic nature of their visual systems. 
W h a t  I mean by this is that every mapping into structure o f  a species' 
visible life-world (or better, the life-world o f  its visual activity) ls a selec· 
tion of criteria! features of the environment which represent needs, 
dangers, or otherwise significant contexts of survival. Now this purely 
functionalist story o f  evolutionary adaptation is not, strlcUy speaking, 
true. For along with the functional, there is the redundant and the 
dysfunctional. Natural selection does not "eliminate," at one blow, or 
even a million blows, all those genetically inheritable, even genetically 
stable traits which may hinder survival, or differentiate survlval·proba· 
bilities of ind ividuals of a species. Also, in the course of genetic differ· 
entiation, intra-specifically, and in speciation, there is a wide variety o f  
traits that are preserved a n d  transmitted, and which do n o t  have a con­
tim"ing function in later variants or species. We tend to label these 
"vestigial," b u t  that may be only a subclass of the redundant traits. The 
redundant traits present possibilities o f  adaptation which m ay arise, or 
occasions for dysfunction which may develop wlth ecological changes. 
So nature m a y ,  in Schiller's or in Peirce's sense, be "sporting," generous 
with non-functional redundancies which offer, so to speak, room for 
36 
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 12 [1981], No. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol12/iss1/4
Sight, Symbol and Society : Toward a H istory of Visual  Perce p t i o n  
biological free pla y ,  variety, proliferation. 
The im portance of this red u n d a n c y ,  like that of surplus of any 
kind, is that it  may c o m e  to be p u t  to use, if  the occasion arises. It ser­
ves, l ike variation in the gene-pool, as a reservior of alternatives some o f  
which m ay c o m e  to b e  selected o u t ,  eventually , as functional traits. 
Nevertheless, whether functional, dysfunctional or redundan t .  genetic­
ally speaking,  we are still talking about heritable, i . e .  biologically trans­
missable traits and ch aracters. The functional ones, - the ones we would 
ordinarily count as  species-defining or «essential" traits - certainly are 
shaped to the modes of life-activity a n d  life-needs o f  a species. In this 
sense, every visual system is an interpreter or nature to the organism 
which evolved it,  and no visual system is,  so to spe a k ,  naive or innocent 
in t,he face or what there is.  All  "looks" are more or less "knowing 
looks" in nature,  w h e n  the "knowledge" is not conscious o r  reflective 
knowledge, b u t  the biological "know-how" which marks the special 
efficacy, efficiency,  adapted ness or the visual system for its ecological 
niche. Before we speak of "theory-laden observation," in science , or 
more generally, of .. culture-laden perception" in h u m a n  life, w e  need 
to acknowledu what we may call the ecologically-laden visual percep­
tion characteristic or all sighted species. If there is no "innocent eye" in 
nature, no more than there is in culture - i.e. if  the animal  eye comes 
already disposed to those visibles which portend w eal and woe for the 
species, then for vision in general,  there are no givens, only, "givens-as." 
W h a t  this does to naive or direct realism ,  in epistemology, is, apparent­
ly to leave it  w i t h o u t  foundation all the way down the biological scale 
(though J.J. Gibson has developed an extremely clever and s u b tle de­
fense or it, thro u g h o u t  his work on perception, md especially in his 
last boo k ,  Ecological Optics). 
If, therefore, all  visual perception is "fra m e w ork-dependent" or 
"within .a paradigm," or constitutes a "natural interpretation" o f  the 
seen world - (choose the usage appropriate to y o u r  favorite philosoph­
ical fash ion) - even u n to the reaches o f  the a n i m al kingdo m ;  and fur­
ther, i( the historicity o r  vision depends upon changes in "fram e w orks,•• 
"paradigms,'' or w h a t  I call modes (or even styles) o f  social praxis a n d  
of represen t a  t i  on in particular - then w h y  does h u m  an vision differ 
in any way from that of all other sighted species in. being historical7 lf 
changes or needs or life-world are mapp1ed into visual structure, both in 
animals a n d  persons, w h e re is the vaunted demarcation? I t  lies, s i m ply 
in this:  what  is imaged in the animal  eye's structure is  its  biological life. 
world,  a n d  it is interiorized or structured genetically . W h a t  is i m aged i n  
h u m an visual structure is  the cultu ral-historical life-world, and it  i 's  i n ter­
iorized o r  structured cultu rally : not in the genes, b u t  in the artifacts o f  
h u m an culture - i n  a r t ,  in visual scenHios, visual seman tics a n d  visual 
intentionalities as these are embodied in artworks, social structures, 
language, rules of action and interpretatio n ,  and in all those "structures" 
which were taken in an earlier time as constituting the subject m atter 
of the G eisteswissenschaften the h u m a n  sciences. 
These are structures of meaning,  of significance-relations, hence, 
sy m bolic structures, from the study o f  w h ich we can (if we do i t  prop-
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erly) read back the modes of life, the self-u nderstanding o f  a culture, 
an age, an historical period. The artifacts: tools, social structu res, tang. 
uage - become our texts. We attempt to reconstruct the modes o f  h u· 
man action i n \'Ol\'ed in the making and use o f  such artifacts. W e  read 
them as symbolic inscriptions, hieroglyphs, externalizations or objecti· 
fications of the modes of action, and forms of cognition and perception 
of their time. We try to see through the eyes o r  the past. and of alterna­
ti\ie cultures and styles, in coming to un derstand such artifacts. Jn effect. 
we attempt to incorporate our own vision w i thin these different struc· 
tu res of perception and cognition, these different ways of seeing. 
Still,  how is this history, and not biological sy m b olization? Precise­
ly in that it is not genetically preser\'ed and transmitted, but rather 
culturally preserved and transmitted, in the "language" {so to speak) 
of representation.  
How odd it is that the metaphors of h u man cultural evolution 
have been adopted as anthropomorphic accounts of genetic·biological 
processes: ON A forms a "code," a language which is "read off" by 
carrier R N A ,  preserved in the chemical structure and transmitted by 
"read-out,,. replication, transference or the "image .. from one site to 
another. O n l y  what can be coded by D N A  is preservable o r  transmiss· 
able, genetically. H�he reduction seems complete: its elements are 
the nucleic acids, its variability lies in combination. In cultural "gene· 
tics" however, there is constant transformat.ion and innovation, as a 
result of h u m a n  creativity. T h e  visible is limited only by the imagin· 
able, as w e  produce new "worlds" for vision, in art, architecture, sci· 
ence, technology, in all aspects of play, in forms of w o r k ,  and in the 
wide reaches of literature and poetic fancy. 
It  is this cultural creativity which produces history - n o t  the dead 
march of extra-human forces or powers. We m ake our own history, and 
we embody its meanings and constraints in external structures, i.e. in 
artifacts - as well as in the more evanescent internalized structures of 
knowledge, belief and feeling. For vision, this means a ram i fication of 
the original biological parameters, to include now whatever affects, 
changes, or results from o u r  ways of seeing. T h e  unit  of visual evolution 
is no longer the gene, b u t  the visual artifact, the thing seen in a certain 
way,  or made to represent the visible, or indeed, to give the rule to 
looking and seeing. Visual structures may therefore be reconstructed as 
cultural-historical complexes, and studied in their change or develop­
ment.  When they are studied in this w a y ,  as social-symbolic structures, 
we will begin to have a history of visual perception. 
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1. The thesis or the historical epistemology is sketched in several essays in my book 
Models: Representation and the Scientific Under:slanding, Dordrecht and Boston: 
D. Reidel , 1979, especially in essays 1 and 1 1 .  They are more ru11y developed in 
Cour lectures on historical epistemology first gjven at MIT in 1974, and in several 
subsequent lectures, all of which are as yet unpublished, but available upon request 
in draft form. 
2. Ibid. See also my "Picturing and Representing," in C.F. Nodine and 0.F. Fisher, 
eds., Views of Pictorial Representation: Making, Perceiving and Interpreting.. New 
Yotk: Praeger, 1980; pp. 272-283; and "Visual Scenarios," in M. Hagen, ed., The 
Perception or Pictures, Vol. II, New York: Academic Press, 1980, pp. 131-152. 
3. See my "Pictures, Representation and the Understanding," In Models ... , Op. Cit., 
and in the same volume, my essay "Rules and Representation: The Virtues or Con­
stancy and Fidelity Put in Perspective," (also in Erkenntniss, Vol. 12, 1978, pp. 17· 
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